Source: Congressional Presentation for Foreign
Operations, U.S. Department of State, FY 1986-2000.
Notes to Table II:
[1] The Military Assistance Program (MAP) used to be the primary
channel for grants of U.S. military equipment to foreign countries.
MAP was phased out in the late 1980s and the FMF program became the
primary channel for grants of U.S. military equipment to foreign
countries.
[2] Loans under the Pentagon FMF program are backed by a reserve
fund which is funded by U.S. taxpayer dollars. For example, since
1994 $106.9 million in taxpayer funds have been set aside in reserve
funds to support more than $1.2 billion of subsidized loans to
Turkey. The U.S. government is responsible for the payment of these
loans if foreign governments default.
[3] ESF assistance to Turkey has been provided primarily in the
form of cash payments which Turkey uses to offset the cost of
substantial weapon purchases from the U.S. As such ESF to Turkey
represents an important indirect subsidy for U.S. arms exports to
Turkey.
In addition to the billions of dollars of U.S. weaponry
transferred via the FMS and commercial sales programs, Turkey has
been a prime beneficiary of surplus U.S. weapons deliveries, both
under the Pentagon's Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program and
through the process of "cascading" weapons that the U.S. took out of
service in order to meet its commitments under the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. During the 1990s alone, the U.S. has
given Turkey weaponry with an original acquisition value of over
$1.9 billion under the grant EDA program. More than three-quarters
of the value of EDA transfers ($1.53 billion) occurred during the
Clinton administration (see Table III, below).
Due to depreciation, weapons transferred under EDA are generally
worth anywhere from 50% to 80% less than they were when they were
originally purchased by U.S. armed forces; but even allowing for
this factor, Turkey has received substantial amounts of usable
combat equipment via this route. A 1996 report by the Arms Sales
Monitoring Project of the Federation of American Scientists stated
that in the first half of this decade, Turkey received an impressive
arsenal of equipment from the United States via the EDA and CFE
cascading channels: 922 main battle tanks, 250 armored personnel
carriers, 72 artillery pieces, 145 combat aircraft, 42 helicopters,
and 9 combat ships. Surplus transfers to Turkey represent an
additional U.S. subsidy worth hundreds of millions of dollars.(10)
Table III:
Grant Excess Defense Articles (EDA) Under Section 516 to Turkey,
FY 1990 to FY 1998
(Congressional Notifications)
| Fiscal
Year |
Original Acquisition
Value |
| FY 1990 |
$56,800,000 |
| FY 1991 |
$342,400,000 |
| FY 1992 |
$238,300,000 |
| FY 1993 |
$626,300,000 |
| FY 1994 |
$107,900,000 |
| FY 1995 |
$156,900,000 |
| FY 1996 |
$18,125,000 |
| FY 1997 |
$273,350,000 |
| FY 1998 |
$111,547,000 |
| Total |
$1,931,622,000 |
Source: Congressional Presentation for Foreign
Operations, U.S. Department of State, FY 1990-2000.
Another economically small but militarily influential form of
U.S. support for the Turkish armed forces comes via the Pentagon's
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which
has provided U.S.-funded training to 23,268 Turkish military
personnel since 1950. Nearly 2,900 Turkish soldiers, sailors, and
pilots have been trained by the U.S. since the beginning of Turkey's
war in the southeast in 1984, and of that total 976 have been
trained during the Clinton administration's tenure. Over the past
decade, Turkey has been the biggest recipient of U.S. military
training, outstripping even first-line U.S. allies like Israel and
Egypt. The dollar amounts involved are fairly modest relative to the
costs of other U.S. security assistance programs to Turkey - a total
of $10.7 million in IMET funding has been provided from FY 1993 to
FY 1999 (see Table IV, next page). But, as the State Department
notes in its most recent presentation to Congress on security
assistance, the IMET program is viewed as "a low cost, highly
efficient component of U.S. security assistance" that "facilitates
the development of important professional and personal relationships
that have provided U.S. access and influence in a sector of society
that often plays a pivotal role in the transition to democracy."(11)
In short, IMET is viewed as a way of gaining influence with and
access to military leaders in key countries. But since the program
is mostly involved with imparting military skills, its impact on
promoting human rights and democratization is arguable. This is
particularly true in a country like Turkey, which is in the midst of
prosecuting a longstanding and brutal civil conflict in which U.S.
personnel and independent observers such as journalists and human
rights monitors are rarely allowed to observe what is happening in
the main zones of combat.
Table IV:
International Military Education and Training Program (IMET)
Assistance Received by Turkey, FY 1950 to FY 1999
(dollars in thousands)
| Fiscal
Year |
$ Value |
No. of
Students |
| FY 1950 to FY 1983 |
119,937 |
20,413 |
| FY 1984 |
3,160 |
215 |
| FY 1985 |
3,297 |
255 |
| FY 1986 |
3,075 |
207 |
| FY 1987 |
3,375 |
196 |
| FY 1988 |
3,461 |
210 |
| FY 1989 |
3,408 |
201 |
| FY 1990 |
3,371 |
212 |
| FY 1991 |
3,552 |
223 |
| FY 1992 |
3,288 |
189 |
| FY 1993 |
3,032 |
211 |
| FY 1994 |
1,006 |
64 |
| FY 1995 |
1,102 |
109 |
| FY 1996 |
1,095 |
121 |
| FY 1997 |
1,454 |
84 |
| FY 1998 |
1,505 |
194 |
| FY 1999 (estimate) |
1,500 |
193 |
| Total 1984 to 1999 |
$40,681 |
2,884 |
| Total 1993 to 1999 (Clinton
Administration) |
$10,694 |
976 |
| Total 1950 to 1999 |
$160,618 |
23,297 |
Source: Congressional Presentation for Foreign
Operations, U.S. Department of State, FY2000 and Foreign
Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military
Assistance Facts, Defense Security Assistance Agency as of
September 1997.
Over the past few years, the levels of U.S. aid provided to
Turkey under major security assistance programs like the Foreign
Military Financing and Economic Support Funds programs have dropped
off dramatically, from an average of $400 million per year in grants
and loans under the two programs during the five years from FY 1993
through FY 1997 down to zero in FY 1998 and FY 1999. In some cases
these reductions have been mandated by Congress to send a message of
disapproval regarding Turkey's human rights performance and its
conduct of the war in the southeast. For example, Rep. John Porter
(R-IL) passed an amendment to the FY 1998 foreign operations
appropriations bill limiting ESF to Turkey to $40 million, half of
which had to be given to non-governmental organizations.(12)
But the bulk of the reductions have been driven by other factors,
such as the need to find cuts in the context of a shrinking foreign
aid pie; Congressional concerns over the risks inherent in FMF loans
(a major source of support for Turkey) which led to the termination
of the loan program; an assessment that Turkey's overall economic
performance justified phasing out ESF and FMF funding as of FY 1999;
and the need to divert scarce security assistance funding towards
new commitments such as helping prospective members of the NATO
alliance upgrade their arsenals to make them interoperable with
those of existing NATO members. Whichever factor was predominant,
the drop-off in U.S. aid was dramatic. The only military aid
programs to receive new infusions of funding over the past two years
have been the IMET program, at about $1.5 million per year, and the
Excess Defense Articles program, which in FY 1998 authorized the
transfer of equipment to Turkey with an original acquisition value
of over $111 million.
These cutbacks in security assistance have not dampened the
Pentagon and State Department's optimistic outlook regarding future
U.S. weapons exports to Turkey. In its FY 1999 congressional
presentation, State asserts that despite the reductions, "The U.S.
intends to continue to support the maintenance and refurbishing of
U.S.-origin defense systems already in the Turkish inventory."(13)
In addition to the commitment to maintain current systems,
statistics presented in the FY 2000 congressional presentation
suggest a significant increase in U.S. sales to Turkey, with
agreements under the FMS program expected to more than double, from
$240.5 million in FY 1998 to $575 million in FY 2000.(14)
It was also estimated that projected deliveries under the commercial
sales program - which are generally much harder to predict with any
accuracy - could quadruple from FY1998 to FY1999. These large
projected increases of U.S. weapons deliveries to Turkey during a
period in which short-term subsidies for U.S. arms sales to Ankara
have been sharply reduced suggest that some of the new sales may be
financed via existing loans and grants that have yet to be fully
tapped, or that the Clinton administration will seek
creative means of financing to support new deals. The alternative
would be for Turkey to devote a larger share of its own budget to
weapons purchases at a time when it is seeking billions of dollars
worth of humanitarian relief from the United States and other
nations to deal with the consequences of the August 17th
earthquake.
The creative financing approach has been utilized before with
respect to Turkey - in the early 1990s, Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-CT)
spearheaded a successful effort to pass legislation allowing the
Export-Import Bank to make a special one-time military loan to
Turkey in support of a $1.3 billion deal for Connecticut-built Black
Hawk helicopters (manufactured by the Sikorsky helicopter unit of
the United Technologies corporation). And the Aerospace Industries
Association has been lobbying Congress and the Clinton
administration to allow borrowers using the Pentagon's Defense
Export Loan Guarantee program to roll the costs of exposure fees
associated with arms sales loans into the cost of the total loan.(15)
This change would allow borrowers like Turkey to use the program
with no up front costs, but it would also increase the risk of
defaults that would have to be paid for by the U.S. Treasury.
If a U.S. firm wins a major new deal for the sale of tanks,
fighter aircraft, or attack helicopters in the context of Turkey's
new weapons shopping spree (see section IV, below), there is a high
likelihood that Turkey and its allies in the U.S. arms industry will
either seek new channels of taxpayer subsidies to support the deal
or seek to get Turkey back on the rolls of the existing FMF or ESF
programs.
Offsets and Coproduction - Subsidizing Turkey's
Military-Industrial Complex:
In addition to the benefits that the Turkish military has derived
from the billions of dollars in U.S. military grants and loans that
it has received over the past two decades, Turkey's military
industry has been a prime beneficiary of assistance from U.S. arms
exporters as a result of arms sales offsets. Offsets are
arrangements negotiated between arms exporting firms and their major
client nations in which the weapons company agrees to provide
specified investments and other economic assistance to "offset" the
costs of importing the system in question. An offset deal is
essentially a quid pro quo: if we buy your weapons, you have to plow
some money into our economy. Direct offsets involve production of
components of the weapons system in the purchasing country. If major
portions of the system are produced overseas (including final
assembly), a direct offset deal is known as a coproduction
arrangement. There are also indirect offsets, in which weapons
companies make investments or undertake promotional activities on
behalf of the client nation in non-military areas. For example, a
company might agree to help build a hotel complex in the client
nation, or provide subcontracts to companies in the host country for
non-military projects, or help promote that client nation's exports
in the U.S. market.(16)
The investments and technology transfers provided by U.S. arms
companies to their foreign clients have mushroomed into a
multi-billion dollar business. In many instances, the business
transferred overseas as part of an offset deal comes at the expense
of U.S. firms - e.g., in a 1997 Commerce Department survey, 83% of
the defense contractors surveyed reported losing significant
business to foreign companies as a result of offset deals.(17)
In the case of Turkey, offset deals often directly benefit
officials of the armed forces, who are heavily involved in Turkish
industry via stock ownership and representation on corporate boards
of directors. As a result, U.S. offset deals with Turkey serve to
enhance the economic power of Turkey's military elite, which in turn
increases their already considerable political clout. Since the
Turkish arms industry is one of the top beneficiaries of defense
offsets from the United States (see Appendix Table C, below), the
economic and political impacts of these deals are substantial. Under
the "Peace Onyx" program, Lockheed Martin (and its predecessor on
the F-16 program, General Dynamics) has helped Turkish Aerospace
Industries (TAI) establish one of the largest assembly lines for
combat aircraft in the world in a facility located on the southern
outskirts of Ankara. Since the program was inaugurated in 1984,
Turkey has ordered 240 F-16s, of which 175 have been delivered to
date. The vast majority of the aircraft have been assembled at TAI's
Ankara facility, which employs 2,000 production workers.(18)
Turkey's F-16 program goes far beyond merely assembling
components produced in the United States. U.S. firms are providing
Turkey with technology, training, and financing to establish a
foothold in the major aspects of military aerospace production.
Towards that end, General Electric helped create Tusas Engine
Industries, a Turkish-American joint stock company which
manufactures engine parts and assembles the F110-GE-100 engine for
the TAI F-16 production line. Lockheed Martin owns a 49% share in
MIKES, a Turkish firm that produces the ALQ-178-V5 radar and
electronic countermeasures systems used on the F-16. And Litton is
collaborating with the Turkish firm Aselsan to build F-16
components.
Just as Lockheed Martin is at the center of helping Turkey build
its own aerospace industry, the U.S.-based FMC Corporation (which
now produces armored vehicles as part of a joint venture arrangement
with the Harsco Corporation under the name United Defense) has been
in on the ground floor of helping Turkish industry develop a
capability to build armored personnel carriers and military trucks.
In 1991, the Turkish firm FMC-Nurol began production on 1,698
U.S.-designed M-113 armored personnel carriers; as of last year
1,500 of the vehicles had been delivered. The Texas Instruments
corporation is helping the Turkish firm Aselsan build optical sights
and night vision equipment for the Turkish M-113s, and the U.S. firm
Sergant Fletcher has a joint venture with the Turkish company
Kayseri Werkplaats to upgrade existing Turkish M-113s. With
assistance from United Defense, FMC-Nurol has developed a 'family of
military vehicles' ranging from light military trucks to armored
personnel carriers that it is now seeking to export to markets in
Europe and the Middle East.(19)
Turkey will also be seeking coproduction of its new attack
helicopter, which is being bid on by both Boeing (the Apache) and
Bell Helicopter Textron (the King Cobra, an advanced version of the
company's Super Cobra model), as well as a planned $7 billlion
purchase of main battle tanks, in which foreign bidders must team up
with potential Turkish co-producers.(20)
An early 1990s deal for coproduction of Sikorsky Black Hawk
helicopters fell through after criticisms were raised about the use
of these aircraft to ferry Turkish troops into combat in the
southeast, but during this decade Turkey has purchased a total of 95
Black Hawks through direct commercial channels.
Coproduction arrangements with Turkey raise a number of economic
and security questions. On the economic front, coproduction shifts
jobs to Turkey from arms plants in the United States. Lockheed
Martin now assembles or produces components of its F-16 fighter in
11 countries, with full assembly lines in South Korea and Turkey
that rival its main U.S. line - in Fort Worth, Texas - in size. The
assembly line in Turkey has been used not only to produce the planes
purchased by Ankara, but also as the primary production site for an
order of 40 F-16s that went to Egypt in the wake of the Persian Gulf
War. The Egyptian deal - in which aircraft paid for by $1.6 billion
in U.S. military aid were produced in Turkey - is a worst case
example of how coproduction can result in the export of U.S. jobs.
To add insult to injury, the Turkish facility has also been used to
train South Korean workers in production techniques for use on the
F-16 line in Seoul - only after unionized workers at the U.S. F-16
plant in Fort Worth, Texas refused to train their South Korean
counterparts to do their jobs.(21)
Similarly, FMC-Nurol's interest in exporting U.S.-designed M-113s
and military trucks could cut into business that might otherwise go
to U.S. firms - including FMC's own U.S. facilities.
On the security front, the massive transfer of arms production
techniques has implications both for arms proliferation and for the
ability of the United States to exert leverage over Turkey's use of
U.S.-supplied systems. As Turkish firms master larger and larger
shares of the production techniques needed to build U.S. systems, it
will be harder for the U.S. government to influence Turkish behavior
by cutting off spare parts. In addition, the involvement of Turkish
firms in the production of sensitive systems based on U.S.
technology - from ammunition production in conjunction with the U.S.
firm General Defense to the participation of the Turkish firms
Aselsan and Rokestan in a European consortium building the Stinger
shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles - could eventually lead to a
situation in which Turkey might become yet another significant
source of light weaponry to regions of active conflict.
Measuring Dependency - The Role of U.S. Weapons in the
Turkish Armed Forces:
The dependency of the Turkish military on U.S. aid and arms has
created a situation in which it is hard to imagine Turkish forces
undertaking any major operation without utilizing U.S. equipment.
U.S. weaponry is particularly prevalent in the Turkish army and air
force, the two services most heavily involved in the war in the
southeast.
Of the more than 4,200 main battle tanks in the inventory of the
Turkish army, over 3,800 are U.S.-designed M-48 and M-60 models
which have been transferred primarily under surplus weapons giveaway
programs. Similarly, the vast bulk of Turkey's holdings of armored
infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV) and armored personnel carriers
(APC's) consists of 2,813 United Defense M-113 APC's - this
equipment has been used both in Turkey's war in the southeast and in
the Turkish armed forces periodic attacks on Kurdish camps in
northern Iraq (see next section). The Turkish army's attack
helicopter force (37 aircraft) is composed entirely of Bell-Textron
AH-1W Cobra helicopters, which have also reportedly been used in
attacks on Kurdish villages. And the most important transport
helicopter in the Turkish inventory is the Sikorsky Black Hawk (55
transferred to date).(22)
If anything, the Turkish air force is even more dependent on U.S.
technology than the army. Aside from 44 Spanish CN-235 transport
aircraft which were coproduced in Turkey by Turkish Aerospace
Industries, virtually the entire stock of combat aircraft operated
by the Turkish Air Force is made up of U.S.-origin planes, including
175 Lockheed Martin F-16s, 87 Northrop (now Northrop Grumman) F-5s,
and 178 McDonnell Douglas (now part of Boeing) F-4Es.(23)
For a full accounting of U.S. weaponry transferred to Turkey since
1992, see Appendix Table A, below.
III. Turkey's Use of
U.S.-Origin Weaponry in Its War Against the
Kurds
Since 1984 the Turkish armed forces have been engaged in a brutal
and costly war against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a
militant Kurdish opposition group. As noted above, since the
outbreak of the war, over 37,000 people have been killed, most of
them Kurds. In addition, approximately 3,000 Kurdish villages have
been destroyed in the southeastern provinces as part of the Turkish
military's strategy of attempting to eliminate support for the PKK
by attacking entire areas inhabited by suspected PKK
sympathizers.
Turkey has shown little interest in pursuing anything but a
decisive military victory over the PKK and its sympathizers, however
costly or elusive that objective may be in practice. Since the
November 12, 1998 capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, the Turkish
government has refused numerous offers from Ocalan and other PKK
officials for a negotiated end to the conflict. Instead, the Turkish
government is seeking the death penalty against Ocalan for his
alleged role in terrorism. The Turkish military seems intent on
pursuing a military solution to an essentially political problem -
the desire of Turkey's Kurdish population for greater cultural and
political autonomy.
The root of the conflict is the Turkish state's unwillingness to
allow members of the Kurdish population to live as Kurds
within Turkey. Turkey is home to approximately ten million Kurds,
who account for roughly 20% of Turkey's population. Prior to the
war, the majority of Turkey's Kurdish population lived in the nine
provinces in the southeast, an area that is poorer and more
economically underdeveloped than the rest of Turkey. Among other
restrictions, Kurds are banned from speaking their own language in
any official forum or in schools. Kurdish newspapers, cultural
centers, and political parties are routinely banned, attacked, and
in some cases physically destroyed. And while it is true that some
Kurds have been integrated into Turkish society and even enjoy
positions of political and economic influence, they have been able
to achieve this status only by defining themselves as Turks and
giving up their distinct ethnic and cultural heritage. Although many
Kurds oppose the violent tactics of the PKK, the underlying goals of
the insurgency are believed to enjoy strong sympathy from Kurds who
oppose the Turkish government's harsh repression of their political,
civil, and cultural rights.
Both sides in the war have engaged in serious violations of human
rights. PKK abuses have included extrajudicial killings, kidnapping,
extortion, and destruction of property. Attacks are often targeted
against those the PKK accuses of "cooperating with the state,"
including civil servants, teachers, and the families of Kurds who
have joined the "village guards," a civil defense militia armed and
paid for by the Turkish military.
The Turkish military, for its part, has undertaken a systematic
scorched earth campaign in the southeast, intended to eradicate any
popular base of support for the PKK. This policy has resulted in the
deaths of thousands of Kurdish civilians and the displacement of
hundreds of thousands more. The two million or more Kurds who have
been driven from their homes by the war receive little or no
resettlement aid from the Turkish state, and most of them live in
desperate poverty in Turkey's urban shanty towns.
For most Kurdish civilians, the war presents an impossible
predicament. If villagers provide food or logistical support to the
PKK, they risk attack by the Turkish military. If they decide
instead to join the government-aligned "village guards," they will
be subject to attack by PKK forces. As the State Department has
noted, "reputable human rights NGOs, after undertaking research and
field interviews, report that most village evacuations result from
actions by Turkish security forces and that forced displacements
usually result from refusal to join the village guard system or from
supporting the PKK, usually for giving food or a place to sleep,
or for suspicion of committing such acts"(24)
(emphasis added). Some villagers willingly join the village
guards out of economic need or political commitment, but many are
pressured to enter the system. In January 1997, for example, there
were reports of large scale detentions by the gendarmarie in the
Lice district of Dyarbakir (the largest city in the southeast) based
on the refusal of Kurds to join the village guard system.
Throughout much of the war, the Turkish government has imposed a
state of emergency in the southeast, making it very difficult for
journalists, human rights monitors, or other independent observers
to document what is happening there. The Red Cross has also been
banned from conducting relief work in the region. A center for
torture survivors set up by the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey
was shut down for four months just after it opened in 1998, and
staff at the center have been harassed by Turkish officials since
that time.
As this report was going to press, some analysts were discerning
a glimmer of hope that the Turkish military might be quietly
shifting its attitude towards Kurdish cultural rights in response to
the PKK's announcement that it would withdraw its forces from
Turkish territory and suspend armed operations in exchange for the
opportunity to seek Kurdish rights through the Turkish political
process. In a meeting with a select group of Turkish journalists in
early September, Turkey's military chief-of-staff, General Huseyin
Kivrikoglu, acknowledged that the PKK had scaled back its demands
for an independent Kurdistan: "They don't want a federation. What
they want are some cultural rights. Some of these have been granted
anyway." While hardly a ringing endorsement of Kurdish rights,
General Kivrikoglu's statements were greeted warmly by PKK leader
Abdullah Ocalan, who described them as a "positive step in
developing cultural freedom and democratization." Ertugrul Ozkok,
the editor of Turkey's largest circulation paper, Hurriyet,
viewed the tone of the general's remarks on the Kurdish issue as a
significant breakthrough, and suggested dramatically that "Turkey
has come to the brink of a solution."(25)
But the Turkish army quickly distanced itself from these optimistic
projections in a statement asserting that "It is out of the question
that the general staff accept the PKK terror organization as an
interlocutor, discuss its suggestions, or make nay concessions."(26)
The army later affirmed that "the Turkish armed forces are
determined to continue the battle until the last terrorist has been
neutralized," or the PKK completely and unconditionally
surrenders.(27)
Ongoing military activities suggest a continued hardline position
on the part of the Turkish armed forces. On September 5th
- four days after PKK leaders had announced their intention to put
down their arms and leave Turkey - Turkish forces stepped up attacks
on the organization, killing 19 rebels in a battle in the mountains
outside of the southeastern city of Diyarbakir. On September
15th, Turkish forces killed 10 PKK rebels in the
mountains of Hakkari province, which borders Iran and Iraq. On
September 29th, about 5,000 Turkish troops and armed
helicopters entered northern Iraq in pursuit of PKK rebels, bombing
suspected PKK sites and killing at least 13 rebels.(28)
The Turkish government's reaction to the PKK's peace offer has
been mixed at best. In late August the Turkish parliament passed a
"repentance law" which would provide an amnesty for PKK rebels who
lay down their arms, but it only covers rebels who never
participated in any armed operations. Similarly, a recent law
pardoning journalists convicted of writing articles sympathetic to
the PKK continues to uphold the notion that such writings are a
crime under Turkish law, and threatens to imprison authors of
similar pieces in the future (see further discussion below, in
section VI).(29)
U.S. policy on arms exports to Turkey can have an important
impact on the Turkish government's decision making with regard to
the war in the southeast. An open-handed policy of providing arms
without tough conditions on human rights or a peaceful resolution of
the Kurdish conflict could embolden hardliners in the Turkish
military who seek a military "final victory." Restricting arms
unless and until Turkey makes measurable progress on human rights
and peace in the southeast could help tip the balance towards those
in the Turkish government who may be open to a non-military solution
to the Kurdish problem. In deciding how to handle pending arms
requests from Turkey, U.S. policy makers should take a hard look at
Turkey's recent history on arms and human rights.
The Role of U.S. Weapons in Turkish Human Rights
Abuses:
Today, it is widely understood that U.S. weapons have been used
extensively by the Turkish government in its war in the southeast,
and that in many instances these weapons have been used to abuse
human rights and violate the laws of war. The only dispute is over
the extent of abuses utilizing U.S. systems, and whether they have
increased, decreased, or remained steady through the course of the
conflict.
The first official acknowledgment of the role of U.S. weaponry in
human rights violations in Turkey came in a June 1995 State
Department report that was conducted as the result of legislation
promoted by key members of Congress such as Rep. John Porter (R-IL).
Although State Department investigators were denied access to key
conflict areas in the southeast by the Turkish government, their
summary of the evidence they were able to gather was conclusive:
"U.S.-origin equipment, which accounts for most major items of the
Turkish military inventory, has been used in operations against the
PKK during which human rights abuses have occurred." The report also
found "highly credible" evidence that U.S.-manufactured Sikorsky
Black Hawk transport helicopters, Bell-Textron Super Cobra attack
helicopters, and FMC Corp. M-113 armored personnel carriers had been
used to attack Kurdish villages and violate the human rights of
civilians. Citing evidence from 1992 through 1995, during the height
of Turkey's campaign to depopulate Kurdish villages, the report
notes that "it is highly likely that such equipment was used in the
evacuation and/or destruction of villages."(30)
Just three months after the State Department's report came out,
Human Rights Watch issued its own extensive report entitled "Weapons
Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey," based on
field research and interviews conducted inside Turkey. Human Rights
Watch sharply rebuked the State Department report for its "failure
to provide original investigative findings," and for failing to make
"independent and full access to the southeast a top priority in its
dealings with Turkish authorities." Based on its own original
research, the Human Rights Watch report came up with a stronger
version of the conclusion that had been arrived at by the State
Department: "U.S. weapons, as well as those supplied by other NATO
members, are regularly used by Turkey to commit severe human rights
abuses and violations of the laws of war in the southeast."(31)
In light of the pending sale of 145 attack helicopters to Turkey,
Human Rights Watch's finding that U.S.-made helicopters "are the
backbone of the Turkish counterinsurgency effort" is particularly
relevant. Transport helicopters, "most likely U.S.-made and
-supplied S-70A Black Hawks and UH-1 Hueys," are used to bring
troops to Kurdish villages where Turkish soldiers engage in
"forcible displacements, summary executions, indiscriminate fire, or
torture." The report also notes that "helicopter gunships, most
probably U.S.-supplied Cobras, are used to fire indiscriminately at
villages or other civilian settlements, either in an attempt to
frighten villagers into leaving or as part of an indiscriminate
attack against suspected PKK guerillas or suspected PKK civilian
sympathizers."
Human Rights Watch also found that U.S. made tanks, armored
personnel carriers, and other weaponry were directly implicated in
abuses perpetrated by Turkish security forces. One specific example
underscores how these U.S. systems have been used by Turkish forces
in their campaign of destruction against Kurdish villages:
"A former Turkish soldier told Human Rights Watch that on August
18-20, 1992, troops used U.S.-supplied M-48 and M-60 tanks, 105mm
artillery, U.S.-supplied M-113 armored personnel carriers,
U.S.-designed M-16 rifles, and LAW anti-tank rockets to assault the
town of Sirnak following an alleged PKK provocation. Twenty-two
civilians died in the assault, sixty were wounded, and many of the
town's 25,000 residents fled in panic. Much of the town was
destroyed."(32)
Human Rights Watch has also confirmed that Turkish forces often
use U.S.-origin small arms to commit abuses: "Particularly troubling
was the preference displayed by Turkey's special counterinsurgency
forces, who are renowned for their abusive behavior, for U.S.
designed-small arms such as the M-16 assault rifle," made by Colt
Industries. The report goes on to note that U.S.-designed M-16
rifles and M-203 grenade launchers, capable of firing a wide range
of 40 mm high explosives, are "prevalent in the Jandarma and special
police forces, which have the worst human rights reputation in
Turkey's southeast." In addition, officers in the Bolu and Kayseri
Commando brigades of the Turkish army, who have been trained by the
U.S. and "are considered far more abusive of the civilian population
than the regular Army," carry U.S.-made M-16s.(33)
Since 1995, the peak year for the Turkish government's strategy
of widespread depopulation of Kurdish villages, reporting on the use
of U.S. weaponry in the war in the southeast has been much more
sporadic. A July 1997 State Department report on "U.S. Military
Equipment and Human Rights Violations" in Turkey suggests that there
has been a decline in the use of U.S. weaponry to abuse human rights
in Turkey simply because the southeast has been severely depopulated
and there are therefore fewer examples of large-scale abuses. But
the report's own underlying logic seems to suggest that Turkish
government forces are still engaging in human rights abuses, but are
doing so in a series of smaller actions dictated by the current
stage of the conflict. For example, at one point the report notes
that "because so many villages have already been evacuated . . .
there are fewer large-scale forced evacuations of villages by
security forces." But, after noting that most of the fighting is now
occurring in more remote mountainous areas, the report states that
"smaller-scale forced evacuations from remote areas continue." In
short, State seems to be describing a change in Turkish military
tactics, not an improvement in human rights attitudes or
performance. The State Department's 1997 report also acknowledges
that use of U.S. equipment during operations against the PKK in
which "serious abuses are committed by security forces" remains
"likely," and further notes that the Jandarma and police
paramilitary units - the groups most frequently implicated in
"disappearances" and political killings - continue to be armed with
U.S.-origin M-16 rifles and M-203 grenade launchers.(34)
Another particularly troubling use of U.S. weaponry by Turkish
forces is the involvement of U.S. combat aircraft, troop transport
helicopters, and armored vehicles in Turkey's ongoing series of
raids on suspected Kurdish strongholds in neighboring Iran and Iraq.
Although purportedly aimed at PKK fighters, the attacks on northern
Iraq have caused significant civilian casualties and depopulated
Iraqi villages along the Turkish border. In mid-July of 1999, the
Iranian government charged the Turkish air force with bombing
targets inside Iranian territory, killing five people and injuring
ten. Turkish authorities denied the attack at first, as they had
done in the case of a 1994 incursion that Turkey later acknowledged.
But as of this writing the Turkish government had agreed to
undertake a joint investigation of the alleged attack in conjunction
with Iranian authorities.(35)
Turkish aerial and land invasions of northern Iraq - which is
supposed to be a United Nations approved "no fly zone" designed to
protect the vulnerable Iraqi Kurdish population - have become
routine occurrences over the past five years, ranging from a
35,000-strong invasion in 1995 that was described as the largest
cross-border military action in Turkish history, to a 10,000-person
incursion that was undertaken in July of 1999.(36)
The Clinton administration's willingness to stand by and let
Turkey bomb and shell northern Iraq in pursuit of alleged PKK units
stands in stark (and hypocritical) contrast to the participation of
U.S. forces in Operation Northern Watch, the no fly zone that is
meant to keep the Iraqi air force out of the very same
territory.
IV. Fueling Tensions:
Cyprus and the Greek/Turkish Arms Race
Regional Tensions:
While U.S.-supplied helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and
small arms are misused by the Turkish military against Kurdish
rebels, U.S.-origin warships and fighter jets are also used by
Turkey to provoke and threaten Greece and to maintain the conflict
in Cyprus, directly impacting U.S. strategic interests. Though both
are members of NATO, Greece and Turkey have long been bitter rivals
whose regular clashes occasionally risk erupting into military
conflict. Disputes between Turkey and Greece often impact the
formulation of NATO policy, but a full military confrontation
between them would be disastrous for the alliance. Yet by supplying
both Greece and Turkey with large quantities of sophisticated
armaments, the U.S. is helping to augment, rather than alleviate,
regional tensions and is undercutting its own efforts to promote
peace in the Aegean.
The fractious relationship between Greece and Turkey centers upon
Turkey's 25-year occupation of northern Cyprus, disagreement over
the rights to several Aegean islands and natural resources in the
seabed, contention of territorial waters and airspace delineation,
and Greece's alleged support for the PKK. These disputes have
sometimes prompted Turkey to threaten military force against Greece
or Cyprus, threats which cannot always be written off as
grandstanding for domestic consumption. For instance, Greek
ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention in 1995 - which would
allow Greece to extend its territorial waters to cover most of the
Aegean, cutting off major Turkish ports from free access to the high
seas - led the Turkish parliament to give the government the right
to use "all necessary measures," including force, to prevent this
move.(37)
Greece has militarized several islands near the Turkish coast, and
Turkey has deployed a large Turkish amphibious force - outside of
NATO command - along the nearby shore.(38)
Turkish threats of force in the winter of 1998-99 pressured the
Cypriot government to change course on a planned purchase of S-300
surface-to-air missiles and deploy them in Crete instead. Tensions
grew so high over the missile dispute that the U.S. sent in an
aircraft carrier to "monitor events in the region."(39)
Turkey again threatened force against Greece in March 1999 after
it was revealed that Greece had sheltered PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan
in its embassy in Kenya for several weeks.
The U.S. government has regularly encouraged Greece and Turkey to
engage in confidence-building measures and to avoid antagonizing
acts. But rather than using arms control as a stabilizing measure,
the administration's approach has been to make sure that similar
amounts of new weapons enter the Aegean arsenals in parallel. For
example, Turkey's decision in the summer of 1999 to co-produce
Popeye air-to-ground missiles with Israel prompted the U.S.
government to release a sale of similar air-to-ground missiles to
Greece.(40)
Frigates, destroyers, and Hellfire antitank missiles sold to
Greece in the summer of 1998 were matched with a sale of frigates
and Harpoon anti-ship missiles to Turkey. These sales
were announced at a time when the U.S. was trying unsuccessfully to
launch an effort to renew dialogue on Cyprus, leading one to wonder
how the sales notifications to Congress could genuinely proclaim
that the sales "will not adversely affect either the military
balance in the region or U.S. efforts to encourage a negotiated
settlement of the Cyprus question."
The U.S. government should recognize that selling equal amounts
of arms to both parties to a dispute is not an equalizing tactic,
but a destabilizing one.(41)
Both states cite the other as an external security threat and often
a justification for new arms acquisitions. For example, Turkey
sought new frigates and sea helicopters following the flare-up of
tensions in the Aegean in 1996.(42)
Moreover, each new level of technology introduced in the region
ratchets up the arms race another notch, fueling expensive purchases
on both sides. The Turkish decision to launch a $31 billion dollar
military modernization program over the next 10 years was countered
by a Greek decision to reverse its economizing defense cuts and
build up its arsenal as well with $24 billion over the next eight
years.(43)
Greece is currently considering buying a group of F-15 fighter
jets, prompting Turkey to consider upgrading its less sophisticated
F-16 fleet.
Finally, this "evenhanded" approach only heightens the
militarization of a region already laden with large quantities of
weapons. Given the close quarters in which these rivals conduct
military exercises and training, clashes are a regular occurrence,
as are the crises they induce. In training missions or other
sorties, Turkey regularly flies F-16 and F-4 fighters into Greek
airspace, twice buzzing the planes of high Greek officials and often
leading Greece to intercept the jets.(44)
Turkish ships also often enter Greek territorial waters during
exercises, and Greek and Turkish ships regularly challenge each
other in contested waters.
Cyprus remains one of the most militarized spots in the world,
with Turkey maintaining about 30,000 troops on the northern part of
Cyprus and Greece also keeping several thousand troops stationed in
the south. A classified report to Congress in the summer of 1999
revealed that U.S. arms have been sent by both Greece and Turkey to
Cyprus, in contravention of a 1988 law which prohibits equipment
sold under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program from being
transferred to the island.(45)
Press reports from Cyprus state that 90% of the Turkish military
equipment in Cyprus - including tanks, armored personnel carriers,
anti-aircraft systems, and small arms - are of U.S. origin, though
commercial arms sales or pre-1988 FMS sales would not violate the
1988 law.(46)
Both Turkey and Greece sent F-16s to Cyprus in a show of force over
the pending S-300 missile sale, and Turkey also used F-16 and F-4s
during a 1997 major military exercise in Cyprus .(47)
Both countries conduct military exercises on the island, and -
despite occasional short-lived moratoriums - regularly conduct
military over-flights of Cyprus. Elsewhere, Turkey is apparently
sending military equipment - some U.S. supplied or produced under
U.S. license - to Azerbaijan, a move which aggravates the conflict
with Armenia and violates U.S. law on authorized uses for U.S.
exported arms.
Greek-Turkish relations have warmed noticeably in the past few
months in the wake of bilateral cooperation in dealing with the
consequences of the earthquakes which struck each nation (Turkey in
August, Greece in September). Whether these constructive steps in
the areas of business, political, and journalistic exchanges can
carry over into larger issues like a diplomatic resolution to the
Cyprus problem remains to be seen. But as Greek Foreign Minister
George Papandreou has suggested, "I don't think all of a sudden
everything has changed. But a climate exists that could allow for a
breakthrough on these issues."(48)
This conciliatory new climate could be enhanced considerably if the
United States and its close allies stop offering large quantities of
top-of-the-line combat systems to both nations, stoking a
Greek-Turkish arms race in the process.
V. Turkey's Weapons
Shopping Spree: The $150 Billion Question
Mark
The Turkish government is in the midst of what the military
industry journal Defense News has described as "its biggest
weapons buying spree in recent memory, expected to be worth more
than $31 billion during the next eight years and up to $150 billion
by the year 2030."(49)
Major proposed acquisitions that have been announced or concluded
include a $4 billion deal for 145 advanced attack helicopters; a
$560 million sale of 50 Sikorsky Black Hawk transport utility
helicopters; 1,000 main battle tanks at a cost of up to $7 billion;
four submarines for up to $1 billion; four advanced early warning
aircraft for $1 billion; and additional combat aircraft (including a
follow-on order of Lockheed Martin F-16s and a possible first-time
order of Boeing F-15s) at a cost of $2.5 billion or more. For a
detailed rundown of Turkey's potential arms deals in the works, see
Appendix Table B.
Turkey's arms buying plan has multiple rationales, ranging from
assisting in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in Bosnia
and Kosovo to deterring regional rivals like Iran, Syria, and Greece
to building a capability to project force eastward into the Central
Asian states of the former Soviet Union. But the most costly items
on Ankara's shopping list have direct applications in Turkey's war
against the Kurds.
Earlier this year the Turkish government speeded up its $560
million deal for Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters with the explicit
intention of putting them to work ferrying troops to and from the
front lines of the war with the PKK in the southeast. In order to
expedite the deal, Turkish authorities agreed to buy the aircraft
directly, without demanding offsets or coproduction in Turkey. As of
late July of 1999, 10 helicopters out of the 50 ordered had already
been delivered. Given past experience, there is a high probability
that Turkey's planned fleet of 145 modern attack helicopters - for
which the Boeing Apache and the Bell-Textron King Cobra are both
strong competitors - would also be used to attack Kurdish villages,
refugee camps, and mountain strongholds of the PKK or suspected PKK
sympathizers. And Human Rights Watch has already documented the use
of older generation U.S. tanks in the destruction of Kurdish
villages, so there is a danger that some of the 1,000 new tanks
sought by the Turkish army - for which the General Dynamics M-1A2 is
a strong contender - could be used for similar purposes. A late 1998
sale of 140 U.S.-built armored personnel carriers and crowd control
vehicles to the Turkish police has obvious applications in
repressing popular dissent, both in Turkey as a whole and in the
volatile southeastern region.
In announcing a 30-year weapons purchasing program all at once,
Turkish authorities clearly have more than purely military
objectives in mind. They want to get the world's arms manufacturers
salivating over what appears to be a huge long-term market, in the
hopes that they will pressure their governments to cast aside
concerns about Turkey's human rights record and turn their efforts
towards helping their home country's weapons makers close the deal
on one or more major weapons sales to Ankara. This strategy has
clearly worked with respect to U.S. arms makers, who have pressured
Congress and the Clinton administration to clear the way for U.S.
firms to win controversial contracts like the sale of 140 armored
vehicles to the Turkish police and compete for deals like the $4
billion tender for 145 attack helicopters. And General Dynamics,
which has been looking to foreign sales of its M-1 tank to Greece
and Turkey to resuscitate a domestic tank production line which has
been subsisting on upgrade funds from the Army, will no doubt put
its lobbying muscle to bear in favor of substantial new U.S.
government subsidies if it becomes a finalist in the competition for
1,000 new main battle tanks for Turkey. But advocates of arms sales
to Turkey who base their case on economic and pork barrel arguments
can expect to face stiff opposition from arms control and human
rights organizations and their allies in Congress.
The most controversial recent U.S. arms sale to Turkey was the
late 1998 decision to grant a license to the Michigan-based AV
Technology division of General Dynamics to sell 140 armored vehicles
to the Turkish anti-terror and anti-riot police. According to a
description of the deal by Dana Priest of the Washington
Post, the deal includes "11-ton, armored Patrollers, equipped
with water cannons, ramming arms, and front gun ports for urban
anti-riot police, and Dragoons, an armored personnel carrier that
would transport anti-terror police." Because of the dismal human
rights records of Turkey's anti-terror and anti-riot police and the
intention to finance the deal using funds from the U.S.
Export-Import Bank, the deal triggered a review under the "Leahy
Law" - Section 570 of the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Law
sponsored by Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) - which states that "no funds
from the Foreign Operations Appropriations, including financing from
the Export-Import Bank, can be used to provide equipment to foreign
security units if credible evidence of gross human rights violations
by specific units exists."(50)
The armored vehicle deal sparked a debate within the State
Department about whether the "Leahy Law" should apply only if
violations by each specific police unit slated to receive the
vehicle could be documented, or if the potential transfer of
vehicles to provinces in which the anti-terror and anti-riot police
had records of systematic abuses was enough to trigger a denial of
U.S. assistance. Over the strong objections of General Dynamics,
Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) - who made a special trip to Turkey in an
effort to smooth the way for the deal - and U.S. Ambassador to
Turkey Mark Parris, the State Department opted for the broader
interpretation, which would deny assistance to police units in
provinces where there was a consistent, ongoing record of human
rights abuses by the anti-terror and anti-riot police. Based on the
State Department's ruling, General Dynamics was denied Export-Import
bank funding for the 39 vehicles out of the 140 vehicle package that
were destined for 11 provinces (including Adana, which borders the
main area of fighting between the Turkish army and PKK forces in the
southeast). The company sought and received private financing for
the transfer of those 39 vehicles to replace the ExIm funds.
According to the Washington Post's account of the case, the
reasoning for cutting off assistance was convincing:
"The [State Department's] annual [Human Rights] report, and an
internal State Department document prepared for the General Dynamics
case, are rife with examples of abuses by the anti-terror and
anti-riot police in 11 provinces. The internal document says rape,
near-drowning, burning, beatings, and electric shock were common
tactics used by the two police groups, citing reports from the U.S.
embassy in Turkey, the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and
non-governmental groups. Among the 280 victims cited in the internal
document were 'infants, children, the elderly.'"(51)
Given the record of torture and abuse engaged in by the Turkish
police, a strong case can be made that the State Department and the
White House should have gone beyond the requirements of the Leahy
law and denied the armored vehicle purchase altogether.
The next major test of the relative weight of the U.S. commitment
to human rights and democracy in Turkey will come with the decision
about whether to grant a license to U.S. firms to sell Turkey
U.S.-made attack helicopters. But in this case, the State Department
has already gone on record in support of much more stringent
standards for determining whether Turkey is in fact making progress
in reducing human rights abuses and promoting democracy. As noted
earlier, when the Clinton administration first announced its
decision to let Boeing and Bell-Textron compete for the Turkish
attack helicopter sale in December 1997 - hard on the heels of a
letter to the White House by the CEO's of Boeing, Bell-Textron,
General Electric, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman urging that
very course of action - State Department officials outlined seven
specific criteria that would be used to measure Turkey's progress on
democracy and human rights before approving an actual export of U.S.
attack helicopters to Turkey. The seven criteria are as follows: 1)
decriminalization of free speech; 2) release of journalists and
parliamentarians who have been imprisoned for political reasons; 3)
an end to torture and police impunity; 4) reopening of
Non-Governmental Organizations that have been shut down by Turkish
authorities; 5) democratization and expansion of political
participation; 6) the lifting of the state of emergency in
southeastern Turkey; and 7) the resettlement of internal refugees
displaced by the civil war. After several delays, Turkish
authorities now expect to select a contractor for the attack
helicopter deal by May 2000.
The next section reviews Turkey's progress (or lack thereof)
under the seven criteria set out by the State Department. In
preparation for making its own judgment, the State Department sent a
high level delegation to Turkey in August of 1999 to examine the
state of human rights in Turkey. Meanwhile, over at the Pentagon,
Secretary of Defense Cohen has given a strong signal that his
Department will support the attack helicopter deal. During a July
15th press briefing in Ankara, Cohen gave the following
upbeat assessment of the human rights situation in Turkey:
"What I said with respect to future sales of military equipment
is that there are no requests pending for which there are any
impediments whatsoever. I did indicate that in the past there have
been concerns raised on human rights issues by members of Congress.
But I also said that I am encouraged by the Prime Minister's support
for human rights legislation that will receive favorable
consideration by the Parliament and thereby reduce any impediments
in the future. So I am encouraged by what is taking place in Turkey
and am hopeful that impediments will not be raised in the future."(52)
Is Secretary Cohen's optimism about human rights in Turkey
justified? Let's review the record.
VI. Human Rights in Turkey:
Recent Developments
Based on press accounts, recent analyses by independent human
rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, and the State Department's annual human rights report, this
section assesses the performance of the Turkish government and armed
forces with respect to the seven human rights criteria discussed in
the previous section. At the end of the section, an overview
assessment will be made, and some questions will be raised as to
what would constitute significant human rights progress in Turkey in
the current context.
Decriminalization of Free Speech:
In February 1999, Human Rights Watch released a report entitled
Turkey: Violations of Free Expression which pointed out that
the Turkish press "suffers from a multiple personality disorder."
There is "lively and unrestricted" discussion of many important
issues bounded by a "danger zone where many who criticize state
policy face possible state prosecution . . .The risky areas include
the role of Islam in politics and society, Turkey's ethnic Kurdish
minority and the conflict in southeastern Turkey, the nature of the
state, and the proper role of the military." The risks of attempting
to speak or write openly on issues such as the war in the southeast
can be quite high: "Repression for reporting or writing on such
topics includes the killing of journalists by shadowy death squads
believed linked to or tolerated by security forces, imprisonment and
fines against journalists, writers, and publishers, the closing of
newspapers and journals, the banning of books and publications,
denial of press access to the conflict in southeastern Turkey, the
banning of political parties, and the prohibition on the use of
Kurdish in broadcasting and education."(53)
High profile cases of repression against journalists and the
press in recent years include the January 1996 beating death in
police custody of Metin Goktepe, a press photographer; the 1998
imprisonment (for a ten month sentence) of Ragip Duran, a journalist
who has worked for the BBC and the Agence France Presse as well as
numerous Turkish publications, for publishing articles based on an
interview with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan; and the banning of book
of memoirs by Turkish military veterans who had served in the war
against the Kurds in the southeast.
Leftist and Kurdish nationalist publications and journalists are
much more likely to face arrest, imprisonment, government-imposed
shutdowns, and even murder at the hands of death squads that have
connections to government security forces than are journalists who
work for mainstream publications. Human Rights Watch has pointed out
that actions against journalists at mainstream publications for
writing about Kurdish issues or the war in the southeast are often
cyclical, stepping up at times when the government is in a period of
military crackdown and softening at times when peace overtures are
under discussion. Two recent cases show that free speech is still a
hope, not a reality, in Turkey: the June 1999 charges against Andrew
Finkel, a British reporter who has written for Time magazine,
for "insulting the Turkish armed forces" in an article he wrote on
the military situation in the southeast; and the May 1999 imposition
of a 13-month sentence against Oral Carlislar, a prominent Turkish
journalist who writes for the daily Cumhuriyet, for an
interview with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan which was originally
published in 1993.(54)
Two other pending cases that have raised serious concerns about
the state of freedom of expression in Turkey are the cases of Ahmet
Kaya, Turkey's musician of the year for 1998, who has been
threatened with 10 and years in jail for stating publicly that he
wants to compose songs in Kurdish; and Nadire Mater, the author of
Mehmet's Book, a collection of critical memoirs by Turkish
veterans of the war in the southeast, who faces criminal charges for
"insulting" the Turkish military in the book, which has been
banned.(55)
Turkey clearly has a long way to go before it can claim to have
decriminalized free speech, particularly with respect to the Kurdish
issue. As the State Department noted in the section of its 1999
human rights report devoted to Turkey, "government officials
continue to harass, intimidate, indict and imprison human rights
monitors, journalists, and lawyers for ideas expressed in public
forums."(56)
And as Human Rights Watch noted in its February 1999 report on these
issues, improvements will require more than changing a few laws: the
report recommends amending eight separate articles of the Turkish
constitution and repealing or changing 15 separate laws as a
prerequisite to improving the climate of free expression in Turkey.
If these provisions of law were to be changed, the next step would
be to establish a way to monitor whether they are being faithfully
enforced by the judiciary and respected by the police and security
forces.
Release of Journalists and Parliamentarians Who Have Been
Jailed for Political Reasons:
As of late 1998, the Committee to Protect Journalists reported
that 25 journalists in Turkey were in jail for crimes of free
expression - essentially for writing about forbidden topics, which
is currently considered a criminal act in Turkey. In July of 1999,
the Turkish Press Council identified 55 Turkish journalists who were
either in jail or facing charges for "publishing articles deemed
harmful to the Turkish state." In addition, the Voice of America has
reported that "around 25 journalists have been killed over the past
seven years, making Turkey one of the most dangerous countries in
the world for reporters."(57)
In August of 1999, the Turkish parliament passed a bill that
would pardon certain journalists who had been convicted of writing
articles deemed to be supportive of the Kurdish resistance. The bill
was limited in several respects, however: it did not apply to public
statements (as opposed to written work) on the Kurdish issue, and it
subjected journalists freed under the pardon to re-imprisonment if
they wrote new articles viewed as supportive of the "separatists"
within three years of their pardon. Turkish author and social critic
Ismail Besikci was freed under the bill in mid-September, but he
criticized the provision calling for re-imprisonment for similar
offenses: "The postponement law, from the point of view of freedom
of thought and of the press, is shameful. For three years you won't
think, you won't write."(58)And
despite government claims that 32 convicted journalists could be
freed under the law, Oktay Eksi, the head of the Turkish Press
Council, said "I am not sure at all if this law will save Turkey
from the title of the country that jails the most journalists. The
number of journalists in prison will still be high."(59)
In addition to actions against journalists, high profile
political figures such as the mayors of Istanbul and Diyarbakir have
been imprisoned for the content of public speeches - in the case of
Istanbul's mayor, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, he was sentenced to ten
months in prison and banned from politics forever. In September
1998, 17 people, mainly members of the pro-Kurdish HADEP party, were
sentenced to prison terms of 1 to 2 years for articles they had
written in a 1997 edition of the party's official bulletin. HADEP
chairman Murat Bozlak and former Kurdish parliamentarian Leyla Zana
(already serving a 15-year jail term for pro-Kurdish activities)
were the most prominent targets in the case. At the time that
Turkish authorities captured PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in February
1999, hundreds of HADEP members were detained. And although HADEP
leader Murat Bozlak and sixteen other party members were released
from prison in July 1999 after serving eight month sentences for
their alleged role in protests supporting Ocalan's quest for
political asylum outside of Turkey, their release came with a
three-to-five year ban on participation in politics.(60)
The government's moves towards banning HADEP follow Turkey's prior
ban of the pro-Kurdish Democracy party. In all, Turkey has banned 14
political parties since the implementation of its 1982
constitution.(61)
The Turkish government's use of imprisonment, banning, and other
repressive mechanisms to curb or dismantle Kurdish and Islamist
political parties - including the military's virtual threat of a
coup in 1997 if a governing coalition led by the Islamic Welfare
Party did not step down, and the subsequent January 1998 banning of
the party by Turkey's constitutional court - suggests that full
democratic representation for all sectors of Turkish society is
still far from being realized.(62)
An End to Torture and Police Impunity:
The 1999 edition of the State Department's human rights report
suggests that Turkish police and security forces still have grave
problems with torture:
"Extrajudicial killings, including deaths in detention from
excessive use of force, 'mystery killings,' and disappearances
continued. Torture remained widespread. Police and Jandarma
anti-terror personnel often abused detainees and employed torture
during incommunicado detention and interrogation . . . the rarity of
convictions and the light sentences imposed on police and other
security officials for killings and torture fostered a climate of
impunity that probably remains the single largest obstacle to
reducing human rights abuses."(63)
Concern about the involvement of Turkish authorities in death
squad activities has been heightened since a November 3, 1996 car
crash near the western Turkish town of Susurluk. The passengers in
the car, which was filled with weapons, silencers, and false
passports, included Huseyin Kocada, the head of the Istanbul police
academy; Abdullah Cat'l, an organized crime figure and right-wing
thug implicated in numerous politically-motivated killings in
Turkey; and Sedat Bucak, a Kurdish parliamentarian and tribal leader
who had worked closely with the Turkish military in setting up
portions of the "village guard" system that is a backbone of the
Turkish government's war effort in the southeast.
The cast of characters involved in the crash and the items found
in the car strongly suggested a system of formal coordination
between Turkish authorities and right-wing death squads that have
been involved in the murders of prominent Kurdish nationalists in
Turkey. A parliamentary commission set up to investigate the
Susurluk scandal brought no indictments, but a former official who
worked in the intelligence branch of the Diyarbakir Security
Directorate gave testimony suggesting that officials of the Turkish
government had decided to sanction and promote extrajudicial
killings of Kurdish nationalists as a way to accelerate the fight
against the PKK, even if it meant "in the necessity to conduct one's
duty acting outside the law and outside the legal system."(64)
And Human Rights Watch has reported that a January 1998 report on
Susurluk issued by then Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz's office
"admitted that security forces had teamed up with some organized
crime figures and ultra-right wing nationalists to 'eliminate'
ethnic Kurdish businessman, drug dealers, and others believed to be
financing the PKK." The report also noted that one of these
operations was responsible for the 1992 murder of Kurdish journalist
Musa Anter.(65)
In a particularly chilling case of torture by Turkish
authorities, in April 1998 the Istanbul Chamber of Doctors certified
that a 2 and year old child, Azat Tokmak, was kicked and burned with
cigarettes by the Istanbul anti-terror police in an effort to make
his mother, Fatma Tokmak, confess to being a PKK member.(66)
The most recent public assessment of efforts to limit torture on
the part of Turkish authorities is an April 1999 Amnesty
International report, Turkey: The Duty to Supervise, Investigate,
and Prosecute. The report cites a drop in the statistics on
"ill-treatment, torture, 'disappearance,' and extrajudicial
execution" since the peak period of 1992-1995, a change which
Amnesty attributes in part to the reduction in the scale of the war
in the southeast. Amnesty further notes that over the past few years
"there has been much talk, apparently sincere, of new laws,
programs, and regulations to improve human rights," but concludes
that the "sorry contemporary picture" on human rights is unlikely to
improve significantly unless the Turkish government adopts an
assertive policy of "dismantling the immunity from prosecution and
punishment which torturers and state assassins now enjoy."(67)
Among the numerous obstacles to reform cited in the Amnesty Report
is the close relationship between Turkish security forces and the
judiciary - particularly the special State Security Courts and the
Anti-Terror police - which has created a climate in which
allegations of torture are not vigorously pursued.
Reopening of Non-Governmental Organizations that Have Been
Shut Down by Turkish Authorities:
Non-governmental organizations involved in human rights advocacy
or the promotion of Kurdish language and culture still face routine
harassment from Turkish authorities, ranging from government-imposed
shutdowns, to confiscation of newspapers and other publications, to
arrests of key leaders on speech crimes such as "insulting the
military." The most prominent recent case of harassment of a major
Turkish NGO is the June 3,1999 imprisonment of Akin Birdal, the head
of the Turkish Human Rights Association, on charges of "inciting
hatred" for making two speeches in which he called for a negotiated
end to the Kurdish conflict. The European Union condemned Birdal's
one year sentence as a "hard blow to freedom of opinion" in Turkey,
while Holly Cartner of Human Rights Watch asserted that "Turkish
governments since the 1980s have promised to lift restrictions on
freedom of expression, but Mr. Birdal's experience shows how hollow
those promises are."(68)
Birdal's imprisonment came just over a year after he was shot
seven times in the legs and lungs by two gunmen from the right-wing
Turkish Revenge Brigade, an attack that was in part provoked by a
smear campaign in which the Turkish prosecutor's office leaked
information to the press about alleged connections between the Human
Rights Association and the PKK. An officer of the Turkish security
police - the Jandarma - was arrested as a suspect in the attack.(69)
As Amnesty International noted in a June 3rd, 1999
statement in which it adopted Akin Birdal as a prisoner of
conscience, "his prosecution coincides with a wider pattern of
systematic harassment of the HRA . . . by the Turkish state in an
apparent attempt to stifle the organization's activities
permanently." Amnesty further noted that because the government has
closed several HRA branches - including the Diyarbakir branch, which
has been shut down for over two years - "the HRA now has limited
capacity to monitor the human rights situation in the region under
state of emergency, where human rights violations have been even
more severe than in the rest of the country."(70)
As this report was going to press, Akin Birdal was temporarily
freed from jail after a medical report indicated that serving his
full term could be fatal given his ongoing health problems from
gunshot wounds. The office of Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit
indicated that Birdal's sentence would be "postponed" for six
months, implying that he would be expected to serve the rest of his
term if his health improves.(71)
The Lifting of the State of Emergency in Southeastern
Turkey:
In July 1999, the Turkish parliament extended the state of
emergency in six provinces in the southeast, marking more than
twelve years of emergency rule for these areas. The State
Department's human rights report for 1999 provides a brief summary
of the powers associated with emergency rule:
"The regional governor for the state of emergency may censor
news, ban strikes or lockouts, and impose internal exile. The decree
also calls for doubling the sentences of those convicted of
cooperating with separatists. Informants and convicted persons who
cooperate with the state are eligible for rewards and reduced
sentences. Only limited judicial review of the state of emergency
governor's administrative decisions is permitted."(72)
In October 1997, the Turkish government lifted emergency rule in
three other southeastern provinces, but reports by human rights
organizations suggest that even in these areas the government
retains exceptional powers to suppress dissent and limit freedom of
expression.
The Resettling of Internal Refugees Displaced by the Civil
War:
As part of its 1999 human rights report, the State Department
made the following assessment of Turkey's efforts to resettle and
assist refugees displaced by its campaign of destroying Kurdish
villages in the southeast:
"Government programs to deal with and compensate the forcibly
evacuated villagers remain inadequate, as is assistance to those who
have resettled in urban areas. Many migrants continue to live in
overcrowded, unhealthful conditions with little opportunity for
employment."(73)
The State Department report also noted that the Turkish
government's "emergency support program" for resettlement in the
southeast has been criticized by human rights monitors as
"inadequate in relation to the number of forcibly displaced
persons."(74)
Synopsis of Human Rights Situation in Turkey:
While the Turkish government has made repeated pledges to improve
the human rights situation and eliminate government involvement in
incidents of torture and excessive use of force, a June 1999 ruling
by the Council of Europe accused Ankara of "repeated and serious"
human rights violations and charged that there had been "no
significant progress" in the past two years in limiting incidents of
torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.(75)
Turkey's continuing crackdown on journalists, independent human
rights monitors, and Kurdish and Islamic political parties combined
with its systematic failure to bring police and security personnel
to justice for committing acts of murder and torture suggest that it
will take more than a few changes in procedures or the revision of a
few particularly egregious statutes to create the conditions for
genuine human rights improvements in Turkey.
The call for fundamental change in the Turkish political system
received a major boost from a speech given in early September 1999
by Sami Selcuk, the President of the Turkish Court of Appeals,
before Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and other members of the
Turkish political elite. Selcuk argued that the legitimacy of
Turkey's 1982 constitution (which is still in effect) is "close to
naught," because it was "imposed on society under threat" by the
leaders of a 1980 military coup. He denounced Turkey's policy of
"cultural genocide" (a reference to the treatment of the Kurdish
population) and called for "a real democracy . . . that does not
forbid opinions and beliefs, that allows their free discussion and
emulation under the protection of justice." He pleaded with his
audience that "Turkey must not enter the 21st Century as
a country that is busy, by repressive laws, crushing its inhabitants
and reducing them to silence."(76)
Parts of Selcuk's remarks were broadcast on Turkish television, and
his speech sparked a lively discussion in Turkish newspapers.
Selcuk's critique is part of a new push for reform on the part of
Turkish non-governmental organizations and the Turkish press in the
aftermath of the August 17th earthquake. Allegations of
faulty building standards linked to corruption and widespread
dissatisfaction with the response of the government and the military
to the earthquake - plus the active role of non-governmental
organizations in mobilizing for the relief effort - have contributed
to a climate in which criticism of governmental policies and demands
for reform have escalated dramatically. Whether the Turkish
government decides to respond to these new demands with reform or
repression is still an open question.
In the meantime, absent major initiatives to root out the
systemic sources of repression built into the Turkish legal and
political system and seek a peaceful resolution for the demands for
greater cultural and political autonomy for Turkey's Kurdish
population, the Clinton Administration should rule out the sale of
U.S. attack helicopters to the Turkish government. The next section
will present the outlines of a new U.S. policy towards Turkey that
puts less reliance on arms sales and military cooperation and more
emphasis on conflict resolution and diplomacy. We believe that a
more balanced policy holds out greater hope of promoting democracy
in Turkey and setting the stage for a more stable U.S.-Turkish
relationship over the long term.
VII. A New U.S. Policy
Towards Turkey
U.S. foreign policy towards Turkey is based on the premise that
arms exports "buy influence" over the policies of the importing
state and help cement a strategic partnership. U.S. officials
challenged on the wisdom of arms sales on human rights grounds cite
a long list of strategic interests in the region and claim that
Turkey's cooperation in forwarding U.S. regional interests takes
precedence. Engagement - primarily through arms sales - is also
promoted as a way to modify Turkey's human rights record and its
aggressive behavior in the region. Yet, as we have demonstrated
above, in the case of Turkey the "arms sales buy influence" mantra
is belied by the facts. In reality, Washington has had little sway
over Ankara's behavior in key foreign policy areas such as promoting
human rights and democracy, preserving regional stability, keeping
Turkey tied to Western Europe, and promoting Turkish economic
growth. In fact, as will be shown below, failure to persuade Turkey
to change its policies on several key issues has meant that Turkey
has often acted directly against U.S. national interests,
often using U.S. arms. On the other hand, political concessions won
through the military-dominated foreign policy are relatively limited
and not worth the costs. A new policy towards Turkey is therefore
imperative.
The arms buy influence fallacy:
Recognizing that human rights protection and democracy are
important stabilizing elements in tense regions, the State
Department has stressed the need for improvements with Turkey in
bilateral discussions and high level official visits. Yet these
messages, plus over $4.9 billion in U.S. arms delivered to Turkey
since 1993, has garnered only limited promises from successive
Turkish governments on key issues such as ending impunity for
torture and de-criminalizing free speech. The seven priority areas
needing improvement described above were articulated to the Turkish
government as conditions for the attack helicopter sale. But State
Department officials have admitted - and the department's 1999 human
rights report to Congress clearly shows - that little or no progress
has been made in any of these areas. Our conclusion must be that
either the U.S. government is not pushing as hard as it claims for
improvement in human rights (and is therefore not straightforward
about its policy priorities) or its efforts - supposedly resting on
the weight of large quantities of arms sales to Ankara - have
failed.
In addition, U.S. diplomacy has had little impact on the way the
war with the PKK has been conducted nor on the search for a peaceful
and rapid conclusion. The State Department documented in both 1995
and 1997 the use of U.S.-origin equipment in human rights abuses
during military operations in the southeast, though Turkey's
increasing restrictions on access to the region made the second
report less instructive (see section III, above). But no punitive
action seems to have followed these revelations, nor has the U.S.
insisted on gaining access to the area to ensure that future abuses
do not occur.
The past half year has presented several opportunities for active
U.S. diplomacy to bring the conflict with the PKK to an end, as U.S.
officials have done in Northern Ireland and Israel, other places
where the U.S. government had formerly categorized insurgents as
"terrorists." Yet when PKK leader Ocalan came under Italian custody
in November 1998, the Clinton administration helped Turkey pressure
Italy to extradite him to Turkey, knowing full well that the Turkish
government would not seize the opportunity to shift tactics and
pursue a negotiated end to the war. Turkey's eventual capture and
trial of Ocalan led predictably to a death sentence, and Ocalan's
pleas to lead his rebel group toward peace have gone largely
unheard. Even after the PKK decided to obey Ocalan's command and lay
down their arms, Turkey, so far, has obstinately refused to stop its
military pursuit of total victory. Meanwhile, if the U.S. government
was encouraging anything but this military strategy, their calls
went unheeded by the Turks, despite their reliance on the U.S. for
continued arms supplies.
The U.S. government's attempts to use arms sales "leverage" to
bring peace to the Aegean have also failed to produce any lasting
changes. Instead, by flooding the Aegean region with high-tech arms,
the U.S. has actually exacerbated existing tensions between Greece
and Turkey. The U.S. often urges Turkey to refrain from military
maneuvers which are certain to provoke Greece or Cyprus, such as
flying F-16s and other planes over Greek airspace and conducting
other "needlessly provocative" operations, but to no avail.(77)
It also tried and failed to persuade Turkey to cancel a major
exercise on Cyprus in 1997. Congressional resolutions call regularly
for an intensified diplomatic effort to resolve the Cyprus deadlock,
and the U.S. at one point assigned super-negotiator Richard
Holbrooke to try to break through the morass. Yet if anything, the
tensions in Cyprus appear to rise year after year.
On the other hand, U.S. government claims that Turkey's value
lies in its status as a cooperative alliance member and strategic
partner are exaggerated. "The belief that Turkey, in exchange for
such succor [helping building Turkey's armed forces into the second
biggest in NATO], will be a loyal enforcer of US policy is
mistaken," says Turkey scholar John Tirman.(78)
Turkey's efforts to become a regional power take it in policy
directions that are often in direct contrast to U.S. goals. For
example, Turkey is disrupting aid to Armenia, while helping to build
up the Azerbaijan armed forces. It has also helped arm Chechen
rebels, again challenging U.S. claims that it is partnering with
Turkey to stabilize the Caucasus. Turkey has only reluctantly
accepted the embargo against Iraq, and uses its economic loses as a
way to blackmail the U.S. into selling more arms. Turkey is pursuing
a natural gas pipeline deal with Iran despite ardent U.S. efforts to
build a pipeline that would circumvent Iran.(79)
Finally, Turkish obstinacy almost stopped the NATO enlargement
process, as Turkey threatened to veto the enlargement decision if it
was not also considered for EU membership.(80)
In fact, the only tangible foreign policy victories the U.S. can
lay claim to vis-à-vis Turkey are Turkish participation in
peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and the use of the
Incirlik base in southern Turkey to monitor the no-fly zone over
northern Iraq. Yet Turkey clearly has an independent interest in
returning stability to the Balkans, regardless of U.S. pressure.
Moreover, a NATO member's participation in a NATO-led mission is no
great foreign policy achievement for the State Department. On the
contrary, the U.S. might have been more cautious in soliciting
Turkish participation in these missions given its imperial history
in the region. Thus, the much-touted gains from an open-ended arms
supply policy can be boiled down to Turkey's support in containing
Iraq. Yet while Turkey reluctantly allows the U.S. to use the
Incirlik base, its military regularly violates the U.S.-enforced
flight ban over Iraq in its own attacks against Kurdish rebel bases
in Iraq. The U.S. government has only halfheartedly sought to
prevent such attacks, communicating to Turkey that "any intervention
in northern Iraq to go after terrorists should be limited in scope
and duration and ensure proper regard for human rights."(81)
With similar statements in the past having gone unheeded, this
hardly seems like an effective way to protect Kurdish civilians in
northern Iraq. Moreover, as will be shown below, the U.S. has
sacrificed many other foreign policy goals in the region for this
gain, leaving one to question U.S. priorities.
Current Policy Damages U.S. Interests:
The protection of minority ethnic populations is considered an
important tenet of the Clinton administration's foreign policy. As
Secretary Albright stated in 1998, "Support for human rights is not
just some kind of international social work. It is vital to our
security and well-being, for governments that disregard the rights
of their own citizens are not likely to respect the rights of anyone
else. Such regimes are also more likely to spark unrest by
persecuting minorities."(82)
Following this logic, NATO forces launched a major air campaign
against Yugoslavia to protect the ethnic Albanian population in
Kosovo, and U.S. jets still patrol "no fly zones" in northern and
southern Iraq, ostensibly to protect the Kurdish minorities against
attack from Saddam Hussein. In stark contrast, the U.S. has provided
assistance - through arms transfers and political support -- for
Turkey's brutal repression of the Kurdish population and an
aggressive war against Kurdish rebels. Failure to offer the same
protection to the Kurdish minority in Turkey is not only
hypocritical, but it also brings into question U.S. motives in
previous humanitarian operations, undermining the credibility of
policy-makers who argue that humanitarian intervention was justified
in those cases.
In the end, neither U.S. nor Turkish interests are served by the
continuation of the war with the PKK, internal repression, or a weak
democracy. As Secretary Albright noted, the protection of minorities
is a matter of U.S. national security because of the destabilizing
effect repression has on a state and its neighbors. Indeed, Turkey's
historic persecution of its Kurdish minority and the lack of avenues
for democratic protest sparked the Kurdish rebellion in 1984, which
was the 28th major rebellion by the Kurdish population
since the founding of the modern Turkish state in 1923. Continued
repression by the Turkish military since 1984 has built up popular
Kurdish support for the PKK's goals, if not methods, which will not
subside until the Kurds feel their views can be truly represented in
Ankara. Other U.S. interests are at risk through the continuation of
the war. The prolonged conflict has at times risked bringing in
other states in the region, such as Syria, Iran, or Iraq, where PKK
fighters have been based. An end to the war would remove one element
of tension between Turkey and Greece, as there would be no more
cause to accuse Greece of aiding the PKK. In addition, if the
U.S.-backed plan for a Caspian Sea oil pipeline through Turkey
progresses, it would go through territory where the PKK currently
operates. Obviously, an end to the war would reduce the risk of
rebel attacks on what will be a substantial U.S. economic
investment.
A democratic Turkey would make a much more reliable ally, but
U.S. support for the Turkish military has taken a heavy toll on
Turkey's burgeoning democracy. If the U.S. government truly wants to
partner with Turkey to combat terrorism and drug-trafficking,
prevent conflict in the Caucasus, and resolve the problems in the
Aegean, it needs to work with a stable, reliable government
unfettered by the risk of military interference. The civilian
government cannot reclaim control over Turkey's domestic and foreign
policies as long as the war continues. In the meantime, the elected
leaders' impotence, widespread war-related corruption, economic
stress, and general popular dissatisfaction have claimed five
governments over the past two years. Social ills resulting from the
war first contributed to the rise of the Islamic party, especially
in the Southeast, where its non-nationalistic tones are appreciated
by the largely Kurdish population. The Welfare party even led a
government in 1997, until Turkish military leaders--supposedly
worried about Prime Minister Erbakan's approach to Islamic states in
the Middle East and pursuit of minor reforms to permit greater
religious expression--forced his resignation. Turkish voters'
frustration with their leaders next led them to vote in surprisingly
large numbers for the far-right nationalist party in the April 1999
elections, boding ill for confidence-building measures with Greece
and for a re-prioritization of human rights.
As noted above, free-flowing arms sales to Greece and Turkey
adversely affect U.S. security interests by undermining U.S. efforts
to bring peace to the Aegean. Turkey uses U.S. arms to fly over
Greek and Cypriot airspace and enter their territorial waters, acts
which help prolong the tense status quo. U.S. efforts to end the
stalemate in Cyprus are defeated by the simultaneous provision of
arms to Turkey, which can be counted on to transfer them to the
Turkish troops in northern Cyprus. Tensions between Greece and
Turkey also damage the credibility and effectiveness of NATO. An
alliance that is unable to settle serious disputes between two
members cannot be a legitimate representative of peace and stability
in Europe.(83)
Bilateral disagreements have at times interfered with key decisions
on budgetary and operational matters, including decisions on NATO
expansion.(84)
As the de facto leader of this alliance, the United States has an
interest in minimizing such intra-member disputes, both for the
health of the organization and to project an image of cohesiveness
and determination. Instead, the U.S. and other NATO allies have had
to invest considerable time and energy diffusing crises between
Greece and Turkey. For example, in January 1996, the entire top U.S.
foreign policy-making team, including the President, spent several
hours coaxing Greece and Turkey away from military confrontation
over an uninhabited islet off the Turkish coast.(85)
Moreover, a stable and productive Greece-Turkey relationship would
have facilitated development of sound policy to address the wars in
the former Yugoslavia; instead, the Greece-Turkey fissure created
fears that they would be dragged into a larger Balkan conflict.
U.S. arms sales and continued conflict in Turkey also damage
Turkey's economy and prospects for economic cooperation with the
West. Given that the U.S. Department of Commerce has identified
Turkey as one of the ten "Big Emerging Markets," U.S. business
interests would be better served by a healthy Turkish economy. The
1998 CIA factbook states that Turkey spends approximately $7 billion
a year on the war with the PKK, which contributed to a 99% inflation
rate for 1998 and a national debt equal to half the government's
revenue. Needless to say, the money invested in this war is money
not being spent on domestic infrastructure and social programs.
Similar amounts of investment in the economically strapped southeast
would be a much more effective way of reducing support for the PKK
than an aggressive military campaign. In addition, war-related
political and financial instability has also discouraged foreign
investment, which could help stimulate growth in the southeast and
elsewhere in Turkey. Furthermore, at a time when damage due to the
August 17th earthquake has been estimated at $7 billion
or more, continuing Turkey's costly war in the southeast seems
particularly ill-advised. Mindful of the contradiction between
spending for arms and spending for reconstruction, Turkey's state
minister for economic affairs Rustu Kazim Yucelen told a group of
Turkish parliamentary deputies "We should consider cuts in the
defense budget."(86)
One oft-repeated foreign policy goal in the Aegean is to keep
Turkey "tied to the West," rather than letting it fall under the
influence of radical Islamic states to its east. But the Turkish
military is traditionally a fiercely secular institution, which is
not in danger of falling under the influence of radical Islam. In
fact, the military - with U.S. support - has used its overbearing
influence over government policy to secure certain pro-secular
policies, force the resignation of Welfare party Prime Minister
Erbakan in 1997, incarcerate prominent Islamic leaders, and force
out a female deputy for wearing a head scarf to Parliament. But such
repression of religious freedom has had the unintended effect of
building support for the Islamic movement. Moreover, the enormous
investment in the war with the PKK has reduced social programs,
caused severe inflation and debt, and spawned widespread
governmental corruption, all issues targeted by the Islamic party's
reform platform. In fact, popular support for the Islamic party only
declined after the democratically-elected Welfare party failed to
achieve the progress it had promised dissatisfied voters. If Erbakan
had been allowed to finish his term, the appeal of an Islamic party
might have been diluted even more as the party became demystified
under voter scrutiny. U.S. policy therefore undermined a democratic
solution to the risk of Islamic fundamentalism and supported a
repressive policy that actually fostered Islamic sentiment.
The goal of keeping Turkey anchored to the West became a greater
priority after it was rejected for European Union membership
consideration in December 1997. (The timing of this rejection was
yet another rationalization for granting marketing licenses for the
attack helicopter sale to be issued in December 1997.) But the EU's
reservations about Turkey came from its failure to live up to
international human rights obligations, its aggression toward EU
member Greece, and its poor economic health. Again, U.S. policy
exacerbated each of these problems by encouraging reckless military
spending and providing the weapons that Turkey has used to abuse
human rights and menace Greece.
Seizing the Moment - Towards a New Policy:
The administration's "open-arms" strategy has failed to reap
enough foreign policy rewards to justify the damage being done to
human rights and stability in the region. A business-as-usual
approach to U.S. arms sales to Turkey would be particularly
inappropriate now, in light of the new diplomatic opportunities that
have been opened up in the wake of the August 17th
earthquake and the September declaration by PKK leaders that they
are willing to abandon armed operations in exchange for political
recognition within Turkey.
The U.S. government should adopt a new policy which stresses
support for Turkey's democratic institutions and peaceful conflict
resolution. A strict link needs to be made between the sale of arms
and the use to which they are put. Thus, the U.S. should stop
selling arms to Turkey until it meets certain specific, clearly
articulated criteria, such as an end to the war with the PKK, an end
to aggressive posturing towards Greece and Cyprus, and the guarantee
of rights to all Turkish citizens.
The first step in this strategy should be a more pro-active U.S.
role in the quest for a peaceful solution to the conflict with the
PKK. Although the Clinton administration labels the PKK a terrorist
organization and would therefore normally not negotiate nor
encourage negotiation with its leaders, it has moved beyond this
static policy in Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. There,
all parties realized it would be counter-productive to rule out
dialogue with groups that had built a significant constituency and
represented real grievances of substantial segments of the
population. PKK leader Ocalan has even suggested that another
organization represent Kurdish interests at the negotiating table.
Perhaps the popular Kurdish political party HADEP, which has
unofficial ties to the PKK, could be a more palatable party to the
talks. This would signify, of course, an end to the Turkish
government's ongoing attempt to ban HADEP.
Turkey is in an excellent position to make the transition from
military to peaceful resolution of this conflict. Military victory
will continue to be evasive, as the Kurds can always retreat to
bases in Iraq and Iran, as they in fact began to do in September of
1999. Moreover, as long as the underlying causes have not been
addressed, the Turkish government can never win the full allegiance
of many Kurds in the southeast. Turkey does, however, have the
military upper hand and should easily be able to tolerate the
limited PKK demands which remain after so many years of fighting.
The rebel Kurds are essentially looking for cultural rights and
greater economic investment; the Turkish government has expressed
support for the latter, and the former should be less objectionable
as a settlement reduces fears of separatism. The situation is
reminiscent of the protracted wars in Central America, which came to
a negotiated close when the outside powers withdrew military
support. The U.S. government, along with its NATO allies, need to do
the same in Turkey if they hope to push forward peace in the Eastern
Mediterranean. A sincere move toward peace, especially backed by the
U.S. government, would surely reduce most war-weary Kurds' support
for maintaining the conflict.
The United States and the other states of the Group of Eight
industrialized states have called for an intensified effort to
resolve the Cyprus conflict in the fall of 1999. The U.S. government
has watched other peace efforts fail as it simultaneously promoted
arms transfers to Greece and Turkey. This time, the U.S. - along
with fellow G-8 arms exporting states - should not undermine their
own diplomatic efforts with a liberal arms export policy. As current
Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit said himself in 1997 as he called for
an arms reduction agreement in the eastern Mediterranean, "If we can
reduce the arms level, it could greatly help Turkey and Greece
resolve their disputes."(87)
U.S. concerns that setting strict conditions on future arms
transfers will irreversibly damage bilateral relations with Turkey
have not looked closely at Turkey's fickle relationship with several
Western European states. Many European governments, including
Austria, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, and Sweden, have taken a
stand against Turkey's human rights record and prohibited arms sales
until progress is made.(88)
Under its previous government, Germany decided not to participate
with its French partner in the tests for the attack helicopter bid,
temporarily disqualifying it for consideration. Germany also
declined to press charges against PKK leader Ocalan when Italy had
him in custody in the fall of 1998. Italy offended Turkey even more
by refusing to extradite Ocalan to Turkey. Yet Turkey's angry
rhetoric against these states soon evaporated, and both countries'
helicopters were included in the group of five finalists announced
in February 1999. In the end, the U.S. usually has better, more
technologically advanced equipment. When the situation in Turkey has
evolved to the point that U.S. arms exports are no longer
problematic, the U.S. industry should have no problem winning future
contracts.
In the meantime, a "peace first" strategy will require the U.S.
government to emphasize non-military aspects of its relationship
with Turkey, such as classic diplomatic and economic ties. The arms
for influence policy has allowed Turkey to elevate arms exports to
the central element of the relationship, leaving bilateral ties
inappropriately susceptible to U.S. export decisions. Every delay on
an arms sale is translated into a near catastrophic break in
relations, and every approval sends a clear signal of support for
Turkey's military policies. As RAND analyst Ian Lesser stated,
"U.S.-Turkish friendship is unlikely to deepen if the arms transfer
issue remains the focus of their relations. The real fix is to
refocus the relationship off narrow, short-term issues toward
long-term shared interests."(89)
U.S. foreign policymakers stand to gain from such a move, as the
current situation gives Turkey the upper hand in the relationship.
By threatening to look elsewhere for arms, Turkey makes U.S.
policymakers reluctant to ask for very much in exchange for the arms
deals, effectively negating the influence arms sales were meant to
provide and discarding the value of all other U.S. aid and
investment. For example, plans for a $3.7 billion oil pipeline
project should be given as much importance by Ankara as decisions on
arms sales.
Until the U.S. government takes a firm stand on arms exports to
Turkey, it will be sending contradictory messages to Turkey and
other states worldwide. On the one hand, the U.S. publicly expresses
support for a democratic Turkey that respects the rights of all
Turkish citizens and the territorial integrity of its neighbors. On
the other, it continues to provide the equipment which undermines
these policies. Conditioning future U.S. arms sales to Turkey on
concrete improvements in human rights and diplomatic resolutions to
Turkey's internal and external conflicts would send the clearest
possible signal of U.S. disapproval for the use of arms in violation
of international law and the clearest demonstration of its
commitment to peace in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Appendix
Tables
Table A: U.S.
Arms Transfers to Turkey, 1992 - Present
Table B: Turkey's
Deals in the Works
Table C: Coproduction
and Offset Deals with Turkey
1. For one of many discussions on the role of
human rights concerns in the Kosovo conflict, see Tina Rosenberg, "A
Bad Year for the World's Boarder Guards," New York Times,
July 2, 1999, in which she states that "NATO's bombing of Serbia was
based on . . . enforcing respect for international law."
2. An Associated Press dispatch filed on August
5, 1999 (entitled "Kurd Rebels Agree to Leave Turkey") notes that
the "conflict has cost 37,000 lives - mostly Kurds." For estimates
on the numbers of Kurdish villages destroyed and the number of
Kurdish people displaced in the war in the southeast, see U.S.
Department of State, Turkey Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 1998, available on the web at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/
1998_hrp_report/turkey.html, pp.3 and 12. Estimates on the
number of people displaced by the conflict vary so dramatically
(from 500,000 to 2.5 million) because, as Human Rights Watch has
noted, "The exact number of displaced is unknown because no
independent group has been able to freely conduct research in the
region." (see Human Rights Watch, "Background on Repression of the
Kurds in Turkey," available at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/turkey/kurd.htm
3. Raymond Bonner, "U.S. Helicopter Sale to
Turkey Hits Snag," New York Times, March 29, 1996.
4. Stanley Meisler, "Arms Makers Look Overseas
to Make Profits," Los Angeles Times, June 7, 1998.
5. The summary of the State Department's
criteria for approving the attack helicopter sale to Turkey are
drawn from Tamar Gabelnick, "Turkey: Arms and Human Rights,"
Foreign Policy in Focus, Vol. 4, No.16, May 1999, available
at http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/
6. See Gabelnick, op.cit. For an official
overview of the U.S. security relationship with Turkey, see the
special section on "Turkey's Armed Forces: A Modernizing Military,"
in The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance,
Vol. 17, No. 3, Spring 1995, published at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, Dayton, Ohio.
7. U.S. Department of State, Congressional
Presentation for Foreign Operations for FY 1999, p. 339.
8. Ibid., p. 340.
9. Transcript of President-Elect Clinton's
Capitol Hill News Conference, Washington Post, Nov. 20,
1992.
10. Paul F. Pineo and Lora Lumpe, Recycled
Weapons: American Exports of Surplus Arms, 1990-1995,
Washington, DC, Arms Sales Monitoring Project, Federation of
American Scientists, May 1996, p. 19.
11. Congressional Presentation for Foreign
Operation for FY 2000, edition, op.cit., p. 1101.
12. For example, according to the Arms Sales
Monitor, "In a show of displeasure over Turkey's continued poor
human rights performance . . . Congress cut Turkey's Economic
Support Fund payment . . . by two-thirds," while in FY 1998 Turkey
refused to accept its $40 million ESF allotment "because half of the
aid was directed to non-governmental organizations in Turkey working
in support of human rights and democratization." On these points,
see the Arms Sales Monitor, No. 32, March 5, 1996, p.6 and
No. 37, April 10, 1998, p. 5 (both available on the web at www.fas.org/asmp/library/armsmonitor.html
).
13. Congressional Presentation for Foreign
Operations, FY 1999 edition, op. cit., p. 340.
14. Congressional Presentation for Foreign
Operations, FY 2000 edition, pp. 1253, 1286.
15. For a further description of the
Export-Import Bank loan guarantees for Turkey, see William D.
Hartung, Welfare for Weapons Dealers: The Hidden Costs of the
Arms Trade (New York: World Policy Institute, 1996), p. 41. For
the Aerospace Industries Association's position on easing credit
terms on the Defense Export Loan Guarantee Program, see the
discussion in the "Top 10 Issues" of the AIA web site, at http://www.aia-aerospace.org/
16. For a succinct overview of the offsets
phenomenon, see Lora Lumpe, "Sweet Deals and Low Politics: Offsets
in the Arms Market," F.A.S. Public Interest Report, Vol. 47,
No. 1, Washington, DC, Federation of American Scientists,
January/February 1994, online at http://www.fas.org/faspir/pir0294.html.
17. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Export Administration, Offsets in Defense Trade: A Study
Conducted Under Section 309 of the Defense Production Act of 1950,
As Amended (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1996),
p. 64.
18. On employment at the F-16 plant in Ankara,
see Charles Sennott, "In These Deals, Workers Pay," Boston
Globe, Feb. 11, 1996.
19. For further details on partnerships between
U.S. and Turkish firms in the armored vehicle sector, see Appendix
Table C, below.
20. Ege Bekdil and Umit Eginsoy, "Local Ties
Vital to Turkish Tank Bids," Defense News, September 27,
1999.
21. On the Egyptian F-16 deal see Hartung,
Welfare for Weapons Dealers, op. cit., pp. 43-44; on the use
of the Turkish facility to train South Korean workers in F-16
production techniques, see William D. Hartung, And Weapons for
All (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 269-270.
22. Statistics on U.S. weaponry in the Turkish
inventory are from International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance 1998/99 (London: IISS, 1999), pp.
67-69.
23. IISS, Military Balance, op. cit.,
note 19.
24. U.S. Department of State, "Report on
Allegations of Human Rights Abuses by the Turkish Military and on
the Situation in Cyprus," June 1995, p. 12.
25. Chris Morris, "General Raises Hopes of
Softening Towards Kurds," The Guardian (UK), September 8,
1999; and Pelin Turgut, "Kurd Rebels See Turkish Change of Tack,"
Reuters, Sep. 7, 1999.
26. "Top General's Remarks Misinterpreted,
General Staff Says," Agence France-Presse, September 11, 1999.
27. "PKK Rejects Turkish Call for Surrender,
Rules Out Further Concessions," Agence France-Presse, September 29,
1999.
28. Ferit Demir, "Turkish Troops Attack Kurd
Rebels in Iraq," Reuters, September 29, 1999.
29. "26 Killed in Army-PKK Clashes," Agence
France-Presse, Sep. 5, 1999; "Turkey Says Army Kills 10 PKK Kurdish
Rebels," Reuters, Sep. 15, 1999; and "Turkey Passes Amnesty,
Excludes Political Crimes," Reuters, Aug. 28, 1999.
30. U.S. Department of State, "Report on
Allegations . . .", op. cit., p. 1.
31. Human Rights Watch, Weapons Transfers
and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey (New York: Human
Rights Watch, November 1995), p. 2.
32. Human Rights Watch, Weapons Transfers .
. ., op. cit., p. 11.
33. Ibid., pp. 48, 63; and Dana Priest, "Bonds
Forged in Turkish Drill Exemplify U.S. Forces' Goal," Washington
Post, July 12, 1998.
34. U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Military
Equipment and Human Rights Violations," Report submitted to the
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, July 1, 1997, in
accordance with a request made in Senate Appropriations Committee
Report 104-295, asking that the "Secretary of State update an
earlier report on allegations of human rights abuses by Turkish
security forces," pp. 6 and 12.
35. On the Iranian allegations of Turkish
bombing raids against targets in Iran, see "Turkey and Iran Hold
Security Talks," Turkey Update, August 10, 1999.
36. "Turkish Troops End Iraqi Incursion; 40
Kurdish Rebels Killed," Agence France-Presse, July 10, 1999; and
"Turkey Unleashes a Massive Raid on Kurdish Bases in Iraq,"
International Herald Tribune, March 21, 1995.
37. "Tension Riding High in the Aegean,"
Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1996, p. 120.
38. "Tension Riding High in the Aegean," p.
123.
39. Umit Enginsoy, "Turkey, Greece Edge Closer
to Cyprus Clash," Defense News, June 22-28, 1998, p. 3.
40. Ege Bekdil and Umit Enginsoy, "Turkey,
Israel Move Closer to Popeye 2 Accord," Defense News, Aug. 9,
1999.
41. Umit Enginsoy, "Pentagon Defends Proposed
Sale of Missiles to Turkey, Greece," Defense News, May 25-31,
1998, p. 7.
42. Umit Enginsoy, "Greek Conflict Fuels
Turkish Navy Upgrades," Defense News, Feb. 5-11, 1996, p.
4.
43. Tasos Kokkinides, Lucy Amis and Nino
Lorenzini, "Diplomacy and Arms: West Sends Mixed Messages to Aegean
Adversaries," BASIC Papers, August 1998, p. 1.
44. "Turkey Bolsters North and Warns Greeks,"
Jane's Defense Weekly, January 10, 1996, p. 3.
45. After the report was released, both Greece
and Turkey removed the illegal arms from Cyprus, according to a
congressional staffer familiar with the case.
46. "American-Made Arms in Northern Cyprus:
U.S. Must Act Now," Nicosia Cyprus Mail, Nov. 21, 1998, p.
9.
47. "Turkey, Greece Edge Closer to Cyprus
Clash," Defense News, June 22-28, 1998, p. 3, "Greek, Turkish
Premiers Meet After U.S. Pressure," Jane's Defense Weekly,
Nov. 12, 1997, p. 5.
48. Stephen Kinzer, "A Sudden Friendship
Blossoms Between Greece and Turkey," New York Times,
September 13, 1999.
49. Umit Enginsoy, "Turkish Budget Anticipates
Arms-Buying Program," Defense News, October 26-November 1,
1998.
50. Dana Priest, "New Human Rights Policy
Triggers Policy Debate - Military Aid Restrictions Said to Harm U.S.
Interests," Washington Post, December 31, 1998.
51. Ibid.
52. "DoD News Briefing: Press Conference with
the Turkish Minister of National Defense Sabahattin Cakmakoglu at
the Ministry of National Defense, Ankara, Turkey," July 15, 1999,
available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1999/t07151999_t0715ank.html.
53. Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Violations
of Free Expression (New York: Human Rights Watch, February
1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/turkey/.
Quotes in this paragraph are from the summary, p. 2.
54. Amberin Zaman,"Turkey - Press Freedom,"
Voice of America transcript, June 10, 1999.
55. On Ahmet Kaya, see Turkey Update,
9/13/99, available at http://www.clark.net/kurd/updates/.
On Nadire Mater, see "Turkish Journalist Exposes Frustrations of
Kurdish War," Associated Press, July 31, 1999; and "Journalist
Charged," New York, Committee to Protect Journalists, Alert
Update-Turkey, September 22, 1999.
56. U.S. Department of State, Turkey Country
Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, op. cit., p. 3; and
Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Violations of Free Expression,
op. cit., "Recommendations" section, pp. 1-2.
57. "Turkey One of the Most Dangerous Countries
in the World," Voice of America, July 25, 1999.
58. "Amnesty Scandal in Turkey!,"
Info-Turk, August 31, 1999, available at
http://www.mnsi.net/~mergan95/31-9-99-Ifo-turk-scandal-tky.html.
"Turkish Writer Freed, 79-year Jail Term Suspended," Reuters,
September 16, 1999.
59. "Human Rights Diary: Press Amnesty to Free
Dozens of Turkish Journalists from Prisons," Turkish Daily
News, online edition, September 12, 1999, available at http://www.turkishdailynews.com/FrProbe/latest/dom2.html
60. U.S. Department of State, Turkey Country
Report, op. cit., pp. 2, 14, and 15; and "Pro-Kurdish Party
Leaders Lose Posts Over Prison Sentence," Agence France-Presse, July
21, 1999.
61. Washington Kurdish Institute, "WKI Condemns
Imminent Ban of HADEP, Turkey's Largest Kurdish-based Party; Calls
on OSCE and Other International Institutions to Send Election
Monitors," press release, February 5, 1999; and Louis Meixler, "PKK
Latest in Long Line of Kurdish Rebellions," Associated Press, July
13, 1999.
62. "Crackdown on Kurds and Islamists Before
Elections," Turkey Update, February 5, 1999.
63. U.S. Department of State, Turkey Country
Report, op. cit., p. 2.
64. Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Violations
of Free Expression, op. cit., section VI, p. 2.
65. Ibid., section VI, p. 3.
66. U.S. Department of State, Turkey Human
Rights Report, op. cit., p. 6.
67. Amnesty International, Turkey: The Duty
to Supervise, Investigate, and Prosecute (London: Amnesty
International, April 1999), pp.1-3.
68. Human Rights Watch, "Imprisonment of
Leading Turkish Activist Condemned," news release, June 3, 1999.
69. Amnesty International, "AI Report 1999:
Turkey," p. 2, available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/eur44.htm
70. "Turkey: Akin Birdal Adopted As Prisoner of
Conscience by Amnesty International," Amnesty International news
release, June 4, 1999.
71. "Turkey Frees Top Rights Campaigner,
Suspends Term," Reuters, Sep. 25, 1999.
72. U.S. Department of State, Turkey Country
Report, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
73. Ibid., p. 12.
74. Ibid., p. 12.
75. "European Rights Council Faults Turkey on
Abuses," Agence France-Presse, June 10, 1999.
76. "President of Turkish Court of Appeals
Argues for Democracy," Turkey Update, No. 142, Sep. 9, 1999,
available at http://www.clark.net/kurd/updates/142.html:;
and Chris Morris, "Judge Attacks Turkish Democracy," British
Broadcasting Corporation, Sep. 6, 1999.
77. "Greek, Turkish Premiers Meet After U.S.
Pressure," Jane's Defense Weekly, Nov. 12, 1997, p. 5.
78. John Tirman, "A Country that Needs Tough
Love," Los Angeles Times, Dec. 19, 1997.
79. "Turks Ignore U.S. Wishes and Opt for Iran
Pipeline," Washington Post, Dec. 13, 1998.
80. "Greece and Turkey Surprise with Peace
Pact," Jane's Defense Weekly, July 16, 1997, p. 4.
81. James Rubin, State briefing on Secretary
Albright's meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Dec. 4,
1997.
82. Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright,
Address to the Rosalyn Carter Distinguished Lecture Series, Atlanta,
Georgia, Dec. 3, 1998.
83. Louis J. Klarevas, "If this Alliance is to
Survive . . .," Washington Post, Jan. 2, 1998, p. A23.
84. "Tension Riding High in the Aegean,"
Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1996, p. 123.
85. Marilyn Greene and Steve Komarrow, "U.S.
Jumps on Aegean Crisis," USA Today, Feb. 1, 1996, p. 1.
86. Ege Bekdil and Umit Egensoy, "Turkey's
Defense Plans Slip On Quake," Defense News, Sep. 6, 1999.
87. "Turkish Call for Arms Curb in Region Fails
to Move Greece," Defense News, Oct. 13-19, 1997, p. 24.
88. Norway stopped arms transfers in 1995
because of Turkey's invasion of Northern Iraq.
89. Paul Mann, "U.S., Turkey Encouraged to
Bolster Defense Ties," Aviation Week & Space Technology,
Aug. 11, 1997.
